1.广东电网有限责任公司计量中心，广东省广州市 510080;2.浙江大学电气工程学院，浙江省杭州市 310027;3.东南大学电气工程学院，江苏省南京市 210096
1.Metrology Center of Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510080, China;2.College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China;3.School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
This work is supported by China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd., (No. GDKJXM20161607).
A Stackelberg game model between a single power grid corporation and multiple users is constructed for the demand response. The power grid corporation selects the appropriate time period to formulate the subsidy strategy of demand response based on the predicted load duration curve of the next year. The construction costs of power transmission and distribution are decreased by reducing the peak load, thereby the overall revenue of power transmission and distributionim is improved. Users choose the response in electricity consumption based on the subsidy price of demand response set by the power grid corporation for this time period to obtain additional profits. Moreover, the existence of the Stackelberg game model and the idea for solving the model are analyzed, and the process of solving the game equilibrium solution is presented. Case study shows that the power grid corporation can declares subsidized price during peak load period based on the developed model. Both power grid corporation and users can benefit from demand response. In addition, the impact of the unit cost change of avoidable power transmission and distribution capacity on profits of t demand response for power grid corporation is analyzed.
LIN Guoying,LU Shixiang,GUO Kunjian,et al.Stackelberg Game Based Incentive Pricing Mechanism of Demand Response for Power Grid Corporations[J/OL].Automation of Electric Power Systems,http://doi.org/10.7500/AEPS20190613004.