半月刊

ISSN 1000-1026

CN 32-1180/TP

+高级检索 English
基于主从博弈的电网公司需求响应补贴定价机制
作者:
作者单位:

1.广东电网有限责任公司计量中心,广东省广州市 510080;2.浙江大学电气工程学院,浙江省杭州市 310027;3.东南大学电气工程学院,江苏省南京市 210096

作者简介:

林国营(1982—),男,教授级高级工程师,主要研究方向:高级量测、智能用电。E-mail:lingofive@139.com
卢世祥(1986—),男,博士,高级工程师,主要研究方向:电能量数据挖掘应用、智能用电。E-mail:lu.shixiang@qq.com
郭昆健(1997—),男,硕士研究生,主要研究方向:电力市场、需求响应。E-mail:guokunjian@qq.com
高赐威(1977—),男,通信作者,博士,教授,主要研究方:需求侧管理、电力市场、电力规划、能源互联网等。E-mail:ciwei.gao@seu.edu.cn

通讯作者:

基金项目:

中国南方电网有限责任公司科技项目(GDKJXM20161607)。


Stackelberg Game Based Incentive Pricing Mechanism of Demand Response for Power Grid Corporations
Author:
Affiliation:

1.Metrology Center of Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd, Guangzhou 510080, China;2.College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China;3.School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China

Fund Project:

This work is supported by China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd. (No. GDKJXM20161607).

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
    摘要:

    文中构建了电网公司与多个用户的需求响应主从博弈模型。其中电网公司基于预测得到的下一年负荷持续曲线,选取合适时间段制定需求响应补贴策略,通过降低峰值负荷减少输配电建设成本,提高输配电整体收益;而用户根据电网公司在某时段制定的需求响应补贴价格决定在该时段的响应量来获取额外收益。文中对主从博弈模型的存在性及求解思路进行了分析,并给出了博弈均衡解的求解流程。算例表明,电网公司可基于所构建模型得到峰荷时段的补贴价格,且电网公司及用户均可通过需求响应而获益。此外算例还分析了可避免输配电容量单位成本变化对电网公司需求响应收益的影响。

    Abstract:

    A Stackelberg game model between a power grid corporation and multiple users is constructed for demand response. The power grid corporation selects the appropriate time period to formulate the subsidy strategy of demand response based on the predicted load duration curve of next year. The construction costs of power transmission and distribution are decreased by reducing the peak load, thereby the overall revenue of power transmission and distribution is improved. Users choose the response in electricity consumption based on the subsidy price of demand response during the time period set by the power grid corporation to obtain additional profits. Moreover, the existence of the Stackelberg game model and the idea for solving the model are analyzed, and the process of solving the game equilibrium solution is presented. Case study shows that the power grid corporation can declares subsidized price during peak load period based on the developed model. Both the power grid corporation and users can benefit from demand response. In addition, the impact of the unit cost change of avoidable power transmission and distribution capacity on profits of demand response for the power grid corporation is analyzed.

    表 1 Table 1
    图1 年持续负荷曲线Fig.1 Annual load duration curve
    图1 年持续负荷曲线Fig.1 Annual load duration curve
    图2 电网公司制定的需求响应补贴价格Fig.2 Subsidy prices of demand response set by grid corporation
    图3 实施需求响应前后峰荷时段负荷对比Fig.3 Load comparison of peak load period before and after implementing demand response
    图4 需求响应时段用户响应功率Fig.4 Response power of users during demand response period
    图5 需求响应时段的用户收益Fig.5 Profits of users during demand response period
    图 可避免输配电容量单位成本对电网公司需求响应收益的影响Fig. Impact of unit cost of avoidable power transmission and distribution capacity on demand response profit of power grid corporation
    图 年持续负荷预测曲线Fig. Annual load duration forecasting curve
    图 可避免输配电容量单位成本对电网公司需求响应收益的影响Fig. Impact of unit cost of avoidable power transmission and distribution capacity on demand response profit of power grid corporation
    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

林国营,卢世祥,郭昆健,等.基于主从博弈的电网公司需求响应补贴定价机制[J].电力系统自动化,2020,44(10):59-67. DOI:10.7500/AEPS20190613004.
LIN Guoying,LU Shixiang,GUO Kunjian,et al.Stackelberg Game Based Incentive Pricing Mechanism of Demand Response for Power Grid Corporations[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2020,44(10):59-67. DOI:10.7500/AEPS20190613004.

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:2019-06-13
  • 最后修改日期:2019-10-09
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期: 2020-05-22
  • 出版日期: