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Stackelberg Game Based Incentive Pricing Mechanism of Demand Response for Power Grid Corporations
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Affiliation:

1.Metrology Center of Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd, Guangzhou 510080, China;2.College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China;3.School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China

Fund Project:

This work is supported by China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd. (No. GDKJXM20161607).

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    Abstract:

    A Stackelberg game model between a power grid corporation and multiple users is constructed for demand response. The power grid corporation selects the appropriate time period to formulate the subsidy strategy of demand response based on the predicted load duration curve of next year. The construction costs of power transmission and distribution are decreased by reducing the peak load, thereby the overall revenue of power transmission and distribution is improved. Users choose the response in electricity consumption based on the subsidy price of demand response during the time period set by the power grid corporation to obtain additional profits. Moreover, the existence of the Stackelberg game model and the idea for solving the model are analyzed, and the process of solving the game equilibrium solution is presented. Case study shows that the power grid corporation can declares subsidized price during peak load period based on the developed model. Both the power grid corporation and users can benefit from demand response. In addition, the impact of the unit cost change of avoidable power transmission and distribution capacity on profits of demand response for the power grid corporation is analyzed.

    表 1 Table 1
    图1 年持续负荷曲线Fig.1 Annual load duration curve
    图1 年持续负荷曲线Fig.1 Annual load duration curve
    图2 电网公司制定的需求响应补贴价格Fig.2 Subsidy prices of demand response set by grid corporation
    图3 实施需求响应前后峰荷时段负荷对比Fig.3 Load comparison of peak load period before and after implementing demand response
    图4 需求响应时段用户响应功率Fig.4 Response power of users during demand response period
    图5 需求响应时段的用户收益Fig.5 Profits of users during demand response period
    图 可避免输配电容量单位成本对电网公司需求响应收益的影响Fig. Impact of unit cost of avoidable power transmission and distribution capacity on demand response profit of power grid corporation
    图 年持续负荷预测曲线Fig. Annual load duration forecasting curve
    图 可避免输配电容量单位成本对电网公司需求响应收益的影响Fig. Impact of unit cost of avoidable power transmission and distribution capacity on demand response profit of power grid corporation
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LIN Guoying,LU Shixiang,GUO Kunjian,et al.Stackelberg Game Based Incentive Pricing Mechanism of Demand Response for Power Grid Corporations[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2020,44(10):59-67.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20190613004

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History
  • Received:June 13,2019
  • Revised:October 09,2019
  • Adopted:
  • Online: May 22,2020
  • Published: